123 annihilation of communists and leftists. The pattern of killings was very similar to those in Aceh and Bali, where people were firstly detained and then killed. Even within this alliance between the military and civilians, the latter should not be seen as agentless individuals. The collaboration succeeded because these civilians also carried their own agendas during the violence. These agendas may stretch from organizational or ideological reasoning (for example eliminating political rivals or securing economic properties) to individual levels (for example act of revenge towards a communist neighbour or attempt to grab the neighbor’s land). Added to these motives, are the rewards that the civilians obtained from their collaboration in 1965–66 violence. Rewards may take different forms, from properties to civil service employment and development projects. In short, civilians were gaining benefits from their supra-local attachment to the army. However, even with these rewards and motives, the violence would not have been highly extensive and gruesome if the army did not provide opportunities to do so. Combine with similar findings in Aceh and Banyuwangi, I can strongly conclude that participation of civilians in the 1965–66 was a result of the army’s coordination. This leads us to some insights on collaboration of violence that I have mentioned at the beginning of this article. Collaboration between military and civilians during the 1965–66 violence has a long historical connection to Indonesia’s military political
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