122 the anti-communist purge in their area. The second was the release of the Pancasila Operation on 21 October 1965 by East Java’s military commander, which clearly stated the use of civilians in the army’s operation against the communists. These instructions for anti-communist purge in East Java came a bit late compared to other areas such as Aceh or Central Java, but this was not merely a problem of indecisive attitude of the commander or a technical limitation (shortage of troops). The delay should also be seen as a period of alliance shift – that the Brawijaya command needs to form new alliances (both at the top structural level and the grassroot) against the communists and to assure that it will be sufficient to start a massive purge in the province. At the same time, the existence of a structural order to mobilize and organize civilian groups against the left in East Java confutes the previous assumptions that the gruesome bloodbath in this area was merely a civilian’s wrongdoing or a running amok. It is true that the violence was already commenced by civilian groups right after the announcement that PKI was responsible for the 30 September Movement. From early until mid-October 1965, this violence seems to be unsystematic and rely mostly on the initiatives of local army commanders, Ansor, and other religious or nationalist groups. However, this situation transforms along with the release of Pancasila Operation on 21 October 1965 which clearly instructed the utilization of civilian groups to assist the
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